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Abstract
In a three country model with endogenous tariﬀs, this paper evalu-
ates and contrasts the welfare eﬀects of free trade agreements (FTAs)
and customs unions (CUs) — the two most commonly occurring pref-
erential trade agreements (PTAs). We show that if the external tariﬀ
of a PTA is not too high, it benefits both members and non-members.
We also highlight the implications of a key (but commonly ignored)
distinction between the two types of PTAs: while an FTA member can
form an another (independent) FTA with an existing non-member, a
CU member cannot. Under a pair of independent bilateral FTAs,
the common member’s welfare is higher than that under free trade.
Furthermore, if the common member is relatively eﬃcient compared
to the other two countries, such a ‘hub and spoke’ pattern of FTAs
can yield higher global welfare than free trade. By contrast, such an
outcome is never possible under a CU.
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1 Introduction
As per the World Trade Organization (WTO), over 176 preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) are in force today and most countries participate in mul-
tiple PTAs. In fact, only twelve countries in the world (six of which are
WTO members) do not belong to a PTA and, on average, each country be-
longs to six PTAs (World Bank, 2005). About 40% of world trade occurs
on a preferential basis and so pervasive are PTAs today that most favored
nation (MFN) treatment has begun to appear more of an exception rather
than a core rule of the WTO.1
The spread of PTAs has always been viewed as a mixed blessing by econo-
mists and policy-makers. More than five decades ago, in a seminal paper
Jacob Viner (1950) argued that the distortions created by PTAs can have
adverse welfare consequences for both member and non-member countries.
Since then, a large literature has emerged to shed light on various aspects of
PTAs.2 The goal of this paper is to contribute to this literature by deriving
the welfare eﬀects of PTAs when tariﬀs of both members and non-members
are endogenously determined.3 Abstracting from the process by which PTAs
are formed, the paper focuses on the two most commonly occurring PTAs:
free trade agreement (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs).4 An important con-
ceptual contribution of the paper is that it derives the welfare implications
of a key diﬀerence between FTAs and CUs: whereas a member country of
a bilateral FTA is free to form another (independent) bilateral FTA with
1This number is lower (around 20%) if one allows for the fact that MFN tariﬀs are zero
(or near zero) for many products (World Bank, 2005).
2See Bhagwati et. al. (1999) for a collection of many of the important articles in the
area.
3In a companion paper (Saggi and Yildiz, 2006), we endogenize the formation of FTAs
but take tariﬀs as given.
4An overwhelming majority (i.e. close to 85%) of existing PTAs are free trade agree-
ments (WTO, 2003). Only a handful of existing CUs involve major world markets — the
prime examples being MERCOSUR (the Latin American CU) and several agreements of
the European Community (EC) with Turkey and several Eastern European countries. De-
spite the widespread prevalence of FTAs, the analytical literature on PTAs has tended to
focus more on CUs.
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an existing non-member, a CU member cannot do so because CU members
must impose a common external tariﬀ on non-members. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first paper to draw out the welfare implications of this
important distinction between the two types of PTAs.
In order to tie our results with closely related existing literature (in par-
ticular Krishna, 1998, Ornelas, 2005, and Saggi, 2006), we analyze the eﬀects
of PTAs in a three country oligopoly model of trade policy.5 In this model,
when production costs of the oligopolistic good are equal across countries,
PTAs of all types increase aggregate world welfare — i.e. when countries
are symmetric, trade liberalization of any kind is beneficial (Proposition 1).
The intuition behind this result is that, under cost symmetry, preferential
trade liberalization increases the volume of global trade without causing any
socially harmful trade diversion.6 We also show that if PTA members do
not raise their tariﬀs upon the formation of a PTA, a bilateral PTA nec-
essarily benefits member countries (Proposition 2). Furthermore, even the
non-member country gains from the formation of a PTA so long as the PTA’s
external tariﬀ falls below a certain threshold (Proposition 3).7
An interesting result of the paper is that if there exist a pair of indepen-
dent bilateral FTAs — i.e. if one country (say i) has an FTA with the other
two (i.e. j and k) who do not have an FTA with each other — the common
FTA member (i.e. country i) benefits so much from such preferential liberal-
ization that it is better oﬀ relative to global free trade (Proposition 4). The
5The underlying trade model is a generalization of the reciprocal dumping framework
of Brander and Krugman (1983).
6Incidentally, even if market structure were perfectly competitive, so long as marginal
costs are constant and equal across countries, preferential trade liberalization would lead
to trade creation without causing any trade diversion. However, starting at free trade, the
imposition of a tariﬀ by a country (say i) on only one of its trading partners (say j) reduces
the volume of trade under oligopoly whereas it has no such consequences under perfect
competition because the competitive supply from the favored country (say k) ensures that
equilibrium price in country i’s market still equals marginal cost. By contrast, under
oligopoly, the reduction in country j’s exports is typically not fully oﬀset by an in increase
country k’s exports.
7It is worth noting that whether PTAs benefit member countries is a much debated
question in the literature and in many existing models PTAs can actually harm member
countries.
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flip side of this result is that the other two countries (i.e. countries j and
k) are necessarily worse oﬀ relative to global free trade. This result formally
validates the intuition that when trade agreements create a hub and spoke
type trading regime, the hub can benefit at the expense of the spokes.8 These
welfare results are important not only because of their theoretical novelty,
but also because, as noted earlier, most countries belong to multiple FTAs
and focusing only on bilateral FTAs is unlikely to yield a complete picture
regarding their welfare eﬀects.
Further analysis of a pair of independent bilateral FTAs under cost asym-
metry yields another remarkable result: such a regime can yield higher global
welfare than free trade (Proposition 5). Intuitively, this result obtains when
the common member’s cost of production is much lower than that of the
other two members. Under such a scenario, preferential treatment of the
common member country in its export markets improves world welfare be-
cause such treatment helps allocate a larger share of the world’s output to a
low cost location. Such a global reallocation of output is not possible if the
low cost country belongs to a CU since as a CU member it cannot form an
independent CU with the third country. Thus, even under cost asymmetry,
no pattern of CUs can dominate global free trade from a welfare perspective
(Proposition 6).
In a model closely related to ours, Krishna (1998) has shown that an
FTA between two countries reduces their incentives to liberalize trade with
respect to the third country. However, Ornelas (2005) and Saggi (2006) have
argued that the exogenity of tariﬀs is a crucial assumption behind this result
since endogenously determined FTA tariﬀs can be actually lower than MFN
tariﬀs. Bagwell and Staiger (1997a and 1997b) have called this result the
tariﬀ complementarity eﬀect of PTAs. It is of some interest to note that tar-
iﬀ complementarity has emerged in several diﬀerent models of international
8In Puga and Venables (1997), the formation of a hub and spoke arrangement benefits
the hub whereas it can hurt the spoke nations by making location in the hub more at-
tractive to firms. It is noteworthy that we obtain a similar welfare result even though no
agglomeration eﬀects exist in our model. For further discussion of hub and spoke trading
arrangements see Wonnacott (1996).
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trade: Ornelas (2005) and Saggi (2006) utilize the oligopoly model of intrain-
dustry trade; Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Bond et. al. (2004) consider
general equilibrium Ricardian models; and Bagwell and Staiger (1997a and
1997b) and Ornelas (2006) use competitive partial equilibrium models with
integrated markets. However, all of these models rely on specific assumptions
regarding preferences to obtain tariﬀ complementarity. For example, Bagwell
and Staiger (1997a and 1997b), Ornelas (2005 and 2006), and Saggi (2006)
assume linear demand whereas Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Bond et.
al. (2004) consider Cobb-Douglas preferences. Given that the welfare eﬀects
of PTAs on non-members hinge critically on tariﬀ complementarity, it is im-
portant to know whether this result holds under more general conditions.
However, as Bond et. al. (2004) note, a comparison of equilibrium tariﬀs
under MFN and PTAs is hindered by the fact that PTAs result in discrete
tariﬀ changes relative to MFN. It turns out that the underlying structure
of our model allows us to isolate suﬃciency conditions that shed light on a
comparison of equilibrium tariﬀs under various trade policy regimes. More
specifically, we argue that the suﬃcient condition required for a PTA’s exter-
nal tariﬀ to be positive is less likely to be satisfied relative to the analogous
suﬃcient condition under MFN. This result can be viewed as a weak type of
tariﬀ complementarity.
2 Model
In this section, we present an oligopoly model of international trade in which
each country has a unilateral incentive to impose rent extracting tariﬀs on
its trading partners (unless it commits not to do so via a PTA). There are
three countries (denoted by i, j, k) and two goods: x and y. Preferences over
the two goods are quasilinear: U(x, y) = u(x) + y. Good x is produced by
a single firm in each country at a constant marginal cost c (in terms of the
numeraire good y).
We consider a two stage game of trade policy between three countries.
The problem confronting each country at the first stage of the game depends
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upon the underlying world trade policy regime in place. Under the most fa-
vored nation (MFN) regime, each country imposes a non-discriminatory tariﬀ
on its trade partners to maximize its own welfare. In addition, we consider
two types of PTAs: an FTA and a CU. By their very nature, both types of
PTAs violate MFN since PTA members eliminate tariﬀs only on each other.
However, while FTA members impose independently chosen tariﬀs on the
non-member, CU members coordinate their tariﬀ decisions and implement a
common external tariﬀ. Taking the global trade policy regime and the as-
sociated tariﬀs as given, firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition)
and make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market
(i.e. markets are segmented as in Brander and Krugman (1983) and Brander
and Spencer (1984)).9
2.1 Production and trade
Due to market segmentation, it is suﬃcient to focus on only one country’s
market (say that of country i). Let xzi denote country z’s exports to country
i where z 6= i; xii the sales of firm i in country i; and xi = xii +
X
z 6=i
xzi
denote total sales of good x in country i. Let c denote the marginal cost of
production for good x (i.e. it is equal across countries).
If countries i and z does not belong to a PTA, country z’s exports of
good x to country i are subject to a specific tariﬀ tzi per unit. Let country
i’s tariﬀ vector be denoted by ti = (tji, tki). Using similar notation for the
other two countries, the global tariﬀ vector is denoted by t = (ti, tj, tk). By
assumption, countries impose no taxes on local firms and the numeraire good
(that may be traded internationally in order to balance trade).
Country z’s eﬀective marginal cost of exporting to country i equals c+tzi.
Without loss of generality, set c = 0. Country z’s profit function πzi for
9There is substantial empirical support for the assumption of market segmentation in
the literature on pricing to market behavior — see Knetter (1989 and 1993) and Marston
(1990).
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exports to country i can be written as:
πzi = [pi(xi)− tzi]xzi (1)
First order conditions (FOCs) for profit maximization for exporters are
pi + p0ixzi = tzi (2)
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local firm (i.e.
pi+p0ixii = 0) determine the equilibrium output levels of all firms. Summing
the first order conditions for all firms in country i gives
3pi + p0ixi =
X
z 6=i
tzi (3)
Following Bergstrom and Varian (1985), if the left hand side is downward
sloping (i.e. 4p0i + p00i xi < 0) then total industry output sold in country i
depends only on the sum of the (tariﬀ included) marginal costs of production
of all firms. We assume that this property holds so that total sales in country
i decline with either of its tariﬀs:
dxi
dtzi
< 0 (4)
In addition, the following comparative statics are also assumed to hold:10
dxzi
dtzi
< 0 <
dxii
dtzi
=
dx˜zi
dtzi
(5)
In other words, an increase in tzi lowers country z’s exports to county i (xzi)
while it increases the sales of its local firm (xii) (as well as that of the rival
exporter denoted by ˜z).
As is well known, if markets are segmented and marginal costs are con-
stant, strategic independence of trade policies obtains and own tariﬀs do not
10As is well known, assuming second order conditions for profit maximization hold, these
comparative statics obtain when the Cournot Nash equilibrium is stable and output levels
of firms are strategic substitutes. Since these results are well known, it is convenient to
directly assume that the comparative statics in (5) hold.
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aﬀect export profits.11 Let country i’s domestic surplus si(ti) be defined as
the sum of consumer surplus, tariﬀ revenue, and the domestic firm’s local
profits:
si(ti) ≡ u(xi)− pixi +
X
z 6=i
tzixzi + πii (6)
Welfare of country i can be written as the sum of its domestic surplus and
total export profits:
wi(t) ≡ si(ti) +
X
z 6=i
πiz(tz) where πiz = (pi − tiz)xiz (7)
Finally, world welfare is defined as:
ww(t) = wi(t) + wj(t) + wk(t) (8)
3 Optimal tariﬀs under diﬀerent regimes
As noted earlier, an important diﬀerence between an FTA and a CU is that
members of an FTA choose their external tariﬀs independently whereas CU
members choose a common external tariﬀ. Thus, a country can sign inde-
pendent FTAs with both its trading partners who in turn do not have a trade
agreement with each other whereas such a possibility cannot arise under a
CU. We denote a bilateral FTA between countries i and j by h{ij}i and a
pair of bilateral FTAs with i as the common member by h{ij, ik}i. To econ-
omize notation, a CU between countries i and j is also denoted by h{ij}i
where it is clear from the context whether we are discussing an FTA or a
CU. Finally, a regime where all countries adopt their MFN tariﬀs is denoted
by h{M}i whereas global free trade is denoted by h{F}i.
Since a country imposes no taxes on its own firm, we only need to keep
track of import tariﬀs. Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify our
notation with an example: in the export profit function πki(tki, tji), the first
argument is the tariﬀ faced by country k in country i’s market while the
11Strategic independence arises in many related models: see Ornelas (2005 and 2006),
Bagwell and Staiger (1997a and 1997b), and Kennan and Riezman (1988).
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second argument is the tariﬀ faced by its rival exporter (i.e. the tariﬀ faced
by one’s rival is always listed second).
Finally, at the risk of slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write
profit, domestic surplus, and total welfare as a function of the policy regime
itself. For example, si(M) denotes country i’s welfare under MFN where it is
understood that everyone uses their optimal MFN tariﬀs (to which we turn
next).
3.1 MFN tariﬀs
Under MFN, each country chooses its non-discriminatory tariﬀ to maximize
its own welfare. Strategic independence implies that country i’s tariﬀ choice
problem under MFN basically entails the maximization of its domestic sur-
plus si(ti) with respect to ti:
max
ti
si(ti) ≡ u(xi)− pixi + ti
X
z 6=i
xzi + pixii (9)
Using u0 = pi, the first order condition for the above problem is given by
dsi(ti)
dti
= −dpi
dti
xi +
X
z 6=i
xzi + ti
X
z 6=i
dxzi
dti
+
dpi
dti
xii + pi
dxii
dti
= 0 (10)
where
dpi
dti
= p0i
dxi
dti
(11)
and p0i denotes the slope of the inverse demand function pi(xi). Equation
(10) can be rewritten as
dsi(ti)
dti
=
µ
1− dpi
dti
¶X
z 6=i
xzi + ti
X
z 6=i
dxzi
dti
+ pi
dxii
dti
= 0 (12)
Following Brander and Spencer (1984), the above equation implicitly defines
country i’s optimal MFN tariﬀ tm (due to symmetry, there is no subscript
on tm):
tm = −
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
1− dpidti
´X
z 6=i
xzi + pi dxiidtiX
z 6=i
dxzi
dti
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (13)
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Since dxzidti < 0 and
dxii
dti
> 0 (see equation 5), it follows that tm > 0 if
dpi
dti
< 1 +
pi dxiidtiX
z 6=i
xzi
(14)
As a result, a suﬃcient condition for tm > 0 is that dpidti < 1 — i.e. the optimal
MFN tariﬀ is positive if a small increase in the tariﬀ rate causes the domestic
price to increase by less than the tariﬀ. The second term on the RHS of the
above condition captures the profit shifting motive for a tariﬀ: an increase
in the tariﬀ shifts profits to the domestic firm (dxiidti > 0) and this profit
shifting eﬀect implies that the optimal MFN tariﬀ can be positive even if
the pass through from the tariﬀ to the domestic price is bigger than 1. For
trade agreements to be meaningful in our model, we need tm > 0 so that the
suﬃcient condition in (14) is assumed to hold.
3.2 External tariﬀ of an FTA
In order to see how the formation of an FTA alters the tariﬀ equilibrium
under MFN, we now consider the tariﬀ choice problem of country i under
the bilateral FTA {ij}i. Before proceeding with this comparison, it is worth
discussing why such a comparison is of interest. In order to protect the
interests of non-members and to limit the scope for socially harmful trade
diversion, WTO rules require that PTAs not raise their tariﬀs on non-member
countries (i.e. their external tariﬀs should not exceed their MFN tariﬀs).12
Clearly, to what extent FTA countries actually follow this rule depends upon
how tempted they are to raise tariﬀs on outsiders. An interesting question
in this context is whether FTA countries may voluntarily lower their tariﬀs
on non-members relative to MFN.
12This rule is specified in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT).
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Under the FTA {ij}i, country i solves:13
max
tki
si(tji, tki) where tji = 0 (15)
Following the derivations for tm, the first order condition for the above prob-
lem is given by
dsi(0, tki)
dtki
= − dpi
dtki
xi + xki + tki
dxki
dtki
+
dpi
dtki
xii + pi
dxii
dtki
= 0 (16)
which implies that country i’s optimal external tariﬀ under the FTA h{ij}i
is implicitly defined by the following equation:
tf = −
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
− dpidtki
X
z 6=i
xzi + xki + pi dxiidtki
dxki
dtki
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (17)
Since dxkidtki < 0, it follows that t
f > 0 if
dpi
dtki
<
xkiX
z 6=i
xzi
+
pi dxiidtkiX
z 6=i
xzi
(18)
The above inequality has an analogous interpretation to (14) and a compari-
son of the two inequalities can help shed some light on how the external tariﬀ
of an FTA tf compares with the MFN tariﬀ tm. We turn to this next.
3.3 Tariﬀ complementarity
Under linear demand, Ornelas (2005) and Saggi (2006) have shown that
tf < tm. As noted earlier, the property that countries lower their external
tariﬀs upon forming an FTA has been called the tariﬀ complementarity eﬀect
13Note that due to strategic independence, the tariﬀ choice problem of the non-member
country remains the same as that under MFN and in equilibrium it implements the op-
timal MFN tariﬀ. The problem confronting the other member (i.e. country j) is exactly
analogous to that confronting country i.
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by Bagwell and Staiger (1997a and 1997b).14 As might be expected, without
making further assumptions about the utility function, one cannot explicitly
compare tf and tm. Given this, one potential way of addressing the issue
of tariﬀ complementarity is to ask whether a stronger suﬃcient condition is
needed for the external tariﬀ of an FTA to be positive relative to MFN (i.e.
whether inequality (18) is harder to satisfy than inequality (14)).15 If the
answer to this question turns out to be aﬃrmative, we can then argue that
an FTA is less likely to impose a positive tariﬀ on the non-member country
relative to that under MFN.
To make further progress, consider conditions (14) and (18) at ti = tki =
0. Under this scenario, all firms produce equal amounts so that
X
z 6=i
xzi = 2xki
(and domestic price in country i under MFN and the FTA {ij}i is the same).
At tki = 0, condition (18) can be rewritten as
dpi
dtki
¯¯¯¯
tki=0
<
1
2
+
pi dxiidtkiX
z 6=i
xzi
(19)
It turns out that even at ti = tki = 0, the comparison of (19) and (14) is
not entirely straightforward because both the LHS and the RHS terms of the
two inequalities are diﬀerent. First consider a comparison of the LHS terms.
Since p0i < 0, a comparison of prices under the two regimes is equivalent to a
comparison of total output levels (xi) under the two regimes. We know that¯¯¯¯
dxi
dti
¯¯¯¯
ti=0
>
¯¯¯¯
dxi
dtki
¯¯¯¯
tki=0
(20)
i.e. starting at zero tariﬀs, a given increase in country i’s MFN tariﬀ reduces
the total output sold in country i by a greater amount than an equivalent
tariﬀ increase in its external tariﬀ as a member of the FTA {ij}i.16 This is
14See also Bond et. al. (2004) and Ornelas (2006).
15Note that this approach allows us to accommodate discrete tariﬀ reductions (i.e. from
MFN tariﬀs to zero tariﬀs) among FTA members.
16Starting at zero tariﬀs ensures that the market equilibrium under MFN and the FTA
{ij}i is identical.
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because a country’s MFN tariﬀ applies to both its trading partners whereas
the FTA tariﬀ applies only to the non-member country. This implies that
dpi
dtki
¯¯¯¯
tki=0
<
dpi
dti
¯¯¯¯
ti=0
(21)
i.e. the LHS of (19) is smaller than the LHS of (14).
Now consider the RHS terms of the two inequalities. We observe that if
dxii
dtki
under an FTA is smaller than dxiidti under MFN, the RHS of inequality
(19) is relatively smaller. We argue that this indeed is the case: an increase
in the MFN tariﬀ raises costs of both foreign rivals of the domestic firm
as opposed to only one of them (which is the case under the FTA {ij}i)
implying that the domestic firm’s output increase in response to a given
increase in the domestic tariﬀ must be larger under MFN than under the
FTA {ij}i. Thus, starting at zero tariﬀs (which ensures that domestic price
and total imports are the same under the two regimes), country i’s domestic
firm benefits relatively more from an increase in the MFN tariﬀ compared to
an increase in its external tariﬀ a member of an FTA (or a CU).
The above analysis has established that both the LHS and the RHS of
inequality (19) are smaller than that of inequality (14). This implies that we
cannot unambiguously state that one suﬃcient condition is more restrictive
than the other implying that tariﬀ complementarity may not always obtain.
However, such a conclusion is possible when the price response to a tariﬀ
increase under MFN is roughly twice as large as the price response under an
FTA because then the eﬀect on domestic profits becomes the sole determinant
of which suﬃcient condition is more binding. In other words, when
dpi
dtki
¯¯¯¯
tki=0
≤ 1
2
dpi
dti
¯¯¯¯
ti=0
(22)
we can safely conclude that country i is less likely to impose a positive tariﬀ
on the non-member relative to that under MFN.
At this point it is useful to consider the illustrate the case of linear de-
mand. Suppose pi = α− xi. Then
dxii
dti
=
1
2
whereas
dxii
dtki
=
1
4
(23)
13
i.e. the eﬀect of a small tariﬀ increase on the domestic firm’s local profits
under MFN is exactly twice as large relative to the FTA {ij}i and
dpi
dtki
=
1
4
whereas
dpi
dti
=
1
2
(24)
i.e. inequality (22) exactly binds under linear demand. Inequalities (23) and
(24) imply that tariﬀ complementarity holds under linear demand. In fact
we can show directly that
tf =
α
7
< tm =
3α
10
(25)
As Ornelas (2005) and Saggi (2006) have noted, the intuition for this result
is that the benefits to the local firm of a tariﬀ increase are diluted by the
formation of an FTA since the exporter from the partner country captures
some of the profit increase that results from the imposition of a tariﬀ.
It is worth noting that, while somewhat surprising, tariﬀ complementarity
is rather well supported empirically. In a detailed micro level study, Chang
and Winters (2002) found that tariﬀs on non-members actually declined after
the formation of MERCOSUR (the major Latin American customs union).
Similar evidence is cited in Bohara et. al. (2004) who argue that their
results support Richardson’s (1993) political economy model of endogenous
protection. We now derive the optimal external tariﬀ of a CU and then
examine how it compares to optimal tariﬀs under MFN and an FTA.
3.4 External tariﬀ of a Customs Union
If countries i and j form a customs union (CU), they impose zero tariﬀs
on each other and a common tariﬀ on country k (i.e. tki = tkj = tku). As
members of the CU h{ij}i, country i and j solve
max
tku
wi(0, tku) + wj(0, tku) (26)
Note that this problem is equivalent to countries i and j solving
max
tku
si(0, tku) + πji(0, tku) + sj(0, tku) + πij(0, tku) (27)
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because each member country’s welfare is aﬀected by the partner country’s
tariﬀ only through its export profits in its partner’s market. In other words,
the major diﬀerence between a CU and an FTA is that a CU takes into
account the eﬀect of its tariﬀ on the export profits that members earn in
each other’s markets. Given strategic independence and symmetry, it is
suﬃcient to focus on the maximization of country i’s welfare as a CUmember.
Following the derivations for the FTA case, the first order condition for this
problem is given by
d(si(0, tku) + πji(0, tku))
dtku
= − dpi
dtku
xi+xki+tku
dxki
dtku
+
dpi
dtku
(xii+xji)+pi
∙
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
¸
= 0
(28)
which can be rewritten as
− dpi
dtku
xki + xki + tku
dxki
dtku
+ pi
∙
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
¸
= 0 (29)
which implies that the optimal external tariﬀ of a CU (denoted by tu) is
implicitly defined by the following equation:
tu = −
⎡
⎣
(1− dpidtku )xki + pi
h
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
i
dxki
dtku
⎤
⎦ (30)
Thus, a suﬃcient condition for the external tariﬀ of a CU to be positive is
(i.e. tu > 0)
dpi
dtku
< 1 +
pi
h
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
i
xki
(31)
The interpretation of the above inequality is analogous to (17). The only
diﬀerence between an FTA and a CU is that the CU internalizes the positive
externality that members impose on each other by raising each other’s export
profits due to their tariﬀs on the non-member country.
Given that the two types of PTAs are similar in that only the non-member
faces a tariﬀ, a direct comparison of the two suﬃcient conditions is feasible.
Evaluating the FOC for the optimal CU tariﬀ (i.e. equation 28) at the
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optimal FTA tariﬀ tf gives
d(si(0, tku) + πji(0, tku))
dtku
¯¯¯¯
tku=tf
= − dpi
dtku
xki + xki + tku
dxki
dtku
+ pi
∙
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
¸
(32)
+
dpi
dtku
(xki + xji)− xki − pi
dxii
dtku
which implies that
d(si(0, tku) + πji(0, tku))
dtku
¯¯¯¯
tku=tf
=
dpi
dtku
xji + pi
dxji
dtku
> 0 (33)
i.e. a CU charges a higher tariﬀ than an FTA. The intuition for this result is
clear — each CU member internalizes the benefit its tariﬀ protection confers
on the other member and therefore charges a higher tariﬀ.
Does tariﬀ complementarity hold under a CU? Just like an FTA, a CU’s
external tariﬀ applies only to the excluded country. As before, further in-
sight into the tariﬀ complementarity eﬀect can be obtained by comparing the
suﬃcient condition (31) under a CU with that under MFN (i.e. inequality
(14)) at tku = ti = 0. Once again, to make progress, we have to separately
consider the LHS and the RHS of the two inequalities and as was the case for
the comparison of an FTA and MFN, the LHS of (31) is smaller than LHS
of (14).
Now consider the RHS terms of these inequalities. At t = 0,
X
z 6=i
xzi =
2xki. Thus, the RHS of (31) is larger than the RHS of (14) iﬀ
dxii
dti
≤ 2
∙
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
¸
(34)
In other words, if the marginal increase in the profit of the domestic firm
due to a given increase in the MFN tariﬀ is less than twice the sum of the
marginal increases in the profits of a CU member firms due to an increase
in the CU tariﬀ then tariﬀ complementarity is likely to hold under a CU.
When (34) holds, the LHS of (31) is then smaller than that of (14) while
the RHS is larger implying that the suﬃcient condition for the CU tariﬀ
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to be positive is weaker (i.e. a CU is less likely to charge a positive tariﬀ
relative to an individual country under MFN ). In fact, under linear demand
and symmetry, we can show that
dxii
dti
=
1
2
and
dxii
dtku
=
dxji
dtku
=
1
4
(35)
so that inequality (34) binds under linear demand:
dxii
dti
=
dxii
dtku
+
dxji
dtku
(36)
implying that tariﬀ complementarity holds under linear demand for a CU
as well.17 In general, it is clear from the above analysis that tariﬀ comple-
mentarity is likely to hold under the oligopoly model of intraindustry trade
under fairly general circumstances regardless of whether the PTA is an FTA
or a CU.
4 Trade liberalization and welfare
Given the above discussion of tariﬀ complementarity and the fact that WTO
rules forbid member countries of PTAs from raising tariﬀs on non-member
countries, for the remainder of the paper unless otherwise noted, we restrict
attention to the case where tariﬀ complementarity holds under a CU: tu ≤
tm (which automatically implies that it holds under an FTA as well since
tf < tu). To derive the eﬀects of PTAs on global welfare, we first show that
unilateral trade liberalization of any kind is desirable in our model:
Proposition 1: A reduction in any country’s tariﬀ(s) (whether on a
preferential or a non-discriminatory basis) increases aggregate world welfare.
Diﬀerentiating world welfare with respect to tji gives:
dww
dtji
=
dsi
dtji
+
X
i
dπzi
dtji
where z 6= i. (37)
17In fact, under linear demand,
tU =
5α
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< tM =
3α
10
17
Using u0 = pi and xi = xii +
X
z 6=i
xzi, we have
dsi
dtji
=
dpi
dtji
dxi
dtji
[xi − xii] + pi
dxii
dtji
+ xji + tji
dxji
dtji
+ tki
dxki
dtji
(38)
Also note thatX
z 6=i
dπzi
dtji
=
dpi
dtji
dxi
dtji
[xi − xii]− xji + [pi − tji]
dxji
dtji
+ [pi − tji]
dxki
dtji
(39)
where we have made use of the first order conditions for profit maximization
for each firm. From equations (37) through (39) we have:
dww
dtji
= pi
dxii
dtji
+ pi
X
z 6=i
dxzi
dtji
(40)
Using xi = xii +
X
z 6=i
xzi, the following is immediate:
dww
dtji
= pi
dxi
dtji
< 0 since
dxi
dtji
< 0 (41)
i.e. the lowering of any tariﬀ improves world welfare. Analogous arguments
establish that (i) the lowering of its tariﬀ on an MFN basis must also improve
world welfare and that (ii) it is socially optimal to set an FTA’s external tariﬀ
to zero. As a result, under symmetry, free trade yields higher world welfare
than any other policy regime.
Corollary 1:
ww(F ) > ww(ij, ik) > ww(ij) > ww(M)
The intuition for this is simple: when all countries have the same cost of
production, the allocation of output across countries is immaterial and any
trade restrictions (whether preferential or multilateral) simply lower aggre-
gate world output and therefore welfare. Since any tariﬀ creates a deadweight
loss (i.e. rent extraction by an importing country is more than oﬀset by the
loss in profits of exporters) free trade maximizes world welfare.
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5 Welfare eﬀects of a bilateral PTA
Perhaps the most basic question about PTAs is how they aﬀect the welfare
of member countries. Let tp denote a PTA’s external tariﬀ of a PTA h{ij}i,
where tp represents tf when the PTA in question is an FTA and tu when it
is a CU.
5.1 Eﬀect on members
Note that if tu ≤ tm, both types of PTAs increase the global volume of trade.
Furthermore, under symmetry, PTAs do not cause any trade diversion. Using
these arguments we can show the following:
Proposition 2: If tp ≤ 2tm, a bilateral PTA makes member countries
better oﬀ relative to MFN.
To see the logic behind this result first suppose that tp ≤ tm (i.e. tariﬀ
complementarity holds). Proposition 1 implies that as long as tp ≤ tm the
formation of an PTA cannot make both members and the non-member worse
oﬀ relative to MFN (since world welfare must increase due to trade liberal-
ization). Furthermore, given symmetry, there are only three possibilities (i)
all countries are better oﬀ under a PTA relative to MFN; (ii) members are
better oﬀ while the non-member is worse oﬀ; and (iii) members are worse oﬀ
while the non-member is better oﬀ. To prove proposition 2, we only need to
rule out statement (iii). To see why statement (iii) is false, suppose countries
i and j form an FTA and consider their individual welfare at tki = tkj = tm.
Since only country k faces the tariﬀ tm, it must be that its export profits as
a non-member are lower than those under MFN in both export markets:
πki(tm, 0) = πkj(tm, 0) < πki(tm, tm) = πkj(tm, tm) (42)
Due to market segmentation and strategic independence of tariﬀs, the do-
mestic surplus of country k is unaﬀected by the formation of an FTA between
countries i and j since country k continues to impose its optimal MFN tariﬀ
on countries i and j. The decline in its export profits implies that country
k is necessarily worse oﬀ relative to MFN if FTA members set their external
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tariﬀs equal to their MFN tariﬀs (i.e. tki = tkj = tm). Since all countries can-
not be worse oﬀ due to the FTA (Proposition 1), member countries must be
better oﬀ when their external tariﬀs equal their MFN tariﬀs (tki = tkj = tm).
However, by the definition of tf , each FTA member is better oﬀ using tf than
it is using tm:
wi(0, tf) = wj(0, tf) > wi(0, tm) = wj(0, tm) (43)
Thus, FTA members must surely be better oﬀ relative to MFN. Exactly the
same argument holds for the case of a CU except that its optimal external
tariﬀ is tu.
But what if tariﬀ complementarity fails to hold? Can a PTA make mem-
ber countries worse oﬀ? We claim that as long as the external tariﬀ of a
PTA is no larger than twice the MFN tariﬀ (i.e. tp ≤ 2tm), PTA members
(and world as a whole) must gain from their mutual liberalization. To see
why, note that if tp ≤ 2tm, the total tariﬀ protection of each member country
(defined as the sum of its tariﬀs) declines relative to MFN since the PTA
tariﬀ applies only to the non-member country. Given that total imports of a
country depend only its total tariﬀ protection (see equation (3)), it follows
that total output sold in a country increases if it forms a PTA as long as
tp ≤ 2tm. Due to strategic independence, the non-member’s optimal tariﬀ
does not respond to an PTA and world welfare must increase due to the
trade liberalization undertaken by PTA members so long as respective to-
tal protection levels are lower relative to MFN. Thus, trade liberalization is
more important than tariﬀ complementarity for ensuring proposition 2 holds.
Finally, it is worth noting that members can be better oﬀ under a PTA even
when they do not lower their total tariﬀ protection but the world as a whole
must surely lose if tp > 2tm.
An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that the move from a bilat-
eral PTA to multilateral free trade yields a smaller welfare gain for a member
country than a move from MFN tariﬀs to global free trade. Let
∆wi(M) ≡ wi(M)− wi(F ) and ∆wi(ij) ≡ wi(ij)− wi(F )
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Corollary 2
∆wi(ij) < ∆wi(M)
In other words, the formation of a bilateral PTA makes multilateral free
trade less desirable to member countries. This result is reminiscent of the
findings of Krishna (1998) who focused on the case where the local govern-
ment cares only about the local firm’s profits. Our analysis shows that his
insight extends to the case of welfare-maximizing governments.
5.2 Eﬀect on the non-member
Note that the formation of a PTA does not alter the non-member’s domestic
surplus:
sk(ij) ≡ sk(M) (44)
Thus, the non-member is aﬀected by the PTA h{ij}i only via its export
profits. Let ∆πk(ij) denote the diﬀerence between its export profits under
PTA h{ij}i and MFN:
∆πk(ij) ≡ πki(tp, 0) + πkj(tp, 0)− πki(tm, tm)− πkj(tm, tm). (45)
It follows then that whether the non-member’s fate depends upon how the
PTA’s external tariﬀ compares to the MFN tariﬀ. If tp ' tm, the non-
member is surely worse under the PTA relative to MFN because πki(tm, 0) <
πki(tm, tm). However if tp ' 0, it is better oﬀ under the PTA relative to MFN
because πki(0, 0) > πki(tm, tm). Intuitively, the PTA lowers the cost of its
rival exporter and the non-member can benefit from its formation only if its
own cost also declines substantially.
Proposition 3: There exists a critical threshold tariﬀ t such that a PTA
between countries i and j makes country k (i.e. the non-member) better oﬀ
relative to MFN iﬀ tp ≤ t where πki(t, 0) = πki(tm, tm) and t ≤ tm.18
18In fact, the tariﬀ t is equivalent to the Kemp-Wan (1976) tariﬀ in the context of a
CU. Panagariya and Krishna (2002) show how the Kemp-Wan result regarding the welfare
eﬀects of CUs can be extended to FTAs.
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By now it is clear that how the formation of a PTA aﬀects the desirability
of global free trade from a non-member’s perspective once again depends
crucially on the external tariﬀ of a PTA: if such a tariﬀ is low (i.e. less than
t), the PTA actually benefits the non-member who then gains less from a
move to global free trade relative to that under MFN. In fact, suﬃciently
low PTA tariﬀs can completely eliminate the incentive of a non-member to
pursue multilateral trade liberalization. To see this, note that if the external
tariﬀ of a PTA is close to zero, the non-member would never favor a move
to global free trade since such a move would require it to give up its own
optimal MFN tariﬀ without receiving any benefit in foreign markets.
6 A pair of bilateral FTAs
How do individual countries fare under a pair of independent bilateral FTAs?
We argue below that a pair of bilateral FTAs makes the common member
better oﬀ and the other two members worse oﬀ relative to global free trade.
To see why, first note that starting at free trade, if countries j and k were
to switch to independent bilateral FTAs with only country i, export profits
of country i would increase in both its export markets because in each of its
export markets, country i’s rival exporter would face the tariﬀ tf whereas it
itself would not:
∆πi(ij, ik) ≡
X
z 6=i
πiz(0, tf)−
X
z 6=i
πiz(0, 0) > 0 (46)
Furthermore, the domestic surplus of country i under h{ij, ik}i is the
same as that under free trade since it has a bilateral FTA with both its
trading partners and must therefore practise free trade
∆si(ij, ik) ≡ si(0, 0)− si(0, 0) = 0 (47)
As a result, country i’s welfare under h{ij, ik}i is necessarily higher than
that under free trade:
∆wi(ij, ik) ≡ wi(ij, ik)− wi(F ) > 0 (48)
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From Corollary 1 we know that world welfare is lower under h{ij, ik}i
relative to free trade: ww(ij, ik) < ww(z). Thus it must be that the sum
of countries k and j’s welfare under h{ij, ik}i is lower than that under free
trade:
∆wj(ij, ik)+∆wk(ij, ik) < 0 where ∆wz(ij, ik) ≡ wz(ij, ik)−wk(F ) and z 6= i.
(49)
But since countries j and k both have an independent FTA with country i,
the welfare of each under h{ij, ik}i is the same: wj(ij, ik) = wk(ij, ik). It
follows immediately that both must be worse oﬀ under h{ij, ik}i relative to
free trade h{z}i:
∆wj(ij, ik) = ∆wk(ij, ik) < 0 (50)
In other words, we have shown the following result:
Proposition 4: Under the pair of independent bilateral FTAs h{ij, ik}i,
the common member (i.e. country i) is better oﬀ relative to free trade (and
therefore relative to MFN) whereas the other two countries (i.e. j and k) are
worse oﬀ relative to free trade.19
Proposition 4 also sheds light on how the formation of a pair of indepen-
dent FTAs aﬀects incentives for multilateral trade liberalization. Note that
under h{ij, ik}i, country i is already practising free trade whereas the other
countries are imposing tariﬀs only on each other. But since their welfare
under h{ij, ik}i is lower than that under free trade, they would surely gain
from a move to global free trade.
Corollary 1 implies that the formation of a pair of bilateral FTAs neces-
sarily increases aggregate world welfare when countries are symmetric. But
what if the cost of production of good x diﬀers across countries? Rather than
provide an exhaustive (and repetitive) analysis, we focus on an interesting
new possibility that arises only under cost asymmetry. Let cz denote country
z’s marginal cost of good x where ck ≥ cj ≥ ci = 0. Since cost asymmetry
19Following proposition 3, we can show that if the external tariﬀ of an FTA falls below
a critical threshold then the countries that have only a single FTA are better oﬀ relative
to MFN.
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aﬀects optimal tariﬀs, we use τ (with an appropriate superscript) to denote
optimal tariﬀs under cost asymmetry.
Proposition 5: Suppose ck = cj = c > ci = 0. Then, the pair of bilateral
FTAs h{ij, ik}i can yield higher world welfare than global free trade.
Suppose countries j and k form individual FTAs with country i and let
ck = cj = c > ci = 0. Under such a situation, countries j and k impose zero
tariﬀs on country i and the tariﬀ τF on each other where τF solves
τF = argmax sj(0, τ) = argmax sk(0, τ) (51)
so that
dsj(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
=
dsk(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
= 0 (52)
Now consider the impact of FTA’s external tariﬀ under the trade regime
h{ij, ik}i on world welfare . Using dsi(0,0)dτ = 0 and equation (52) we can write
dww(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
=
X
z 6=i
dπiz(0, τ)
dτ
+
dπjk(τ, 0)
dτ
+
dπkj(τ, 0)
dτ
(53)
In other words, when FTA tariﬀs are optimally chosen by member countries,
a further increase in the external tariﬀs of the FTA countries increases world
welfare iﬀ they increase the total export profits in the world economy.
Note that
dπiz(0, τ)
dτ
= p0
dxz
dτ
xiz+p
dxiz
dτ
= p0
µ
d(xjz + xkz)
dτ
¶
xiz > 0 where z 6= i (54)
i.e. an increase in the tariﬀ on its rival exporter increases country i’s export
profits in both of its export markets.
Similarly,
dπjk(τ, 0)
dτ
=
∙
p0
µ
d(xik + xkk)
dτ
¶
− 1
¸
xjk < 0 (55)
i.e. an increase in the tariﬀ faced by country j lowers its export profits in
country k’s market.
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Also,
dπij(0, τ)
dτ
=
dπik(0, τ)
dτ
(56)
i.e. from country i’s perspective, a small increase in the tariﬀ faced by one
of its exporting rivals is the same as an equivalent increase in the tariﬀ faced
by the other rival exporter.
At τ = τF , the first order condition for world welfare maximization in
(53) can be written as
1
2
dww(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
= p0xij
∙
d(xjj + xkj)
dτ
¸
τ=τF| {z }
>0
(57)
+ xjk
∙
p0
µ
d(xik + xkk)
dτ
¶
− 1
¸
τ=τF| {z }
<0
which is of ambiguous sign if countries are asymmetric.20
Under linear demand, the above simplifies to
1
2
dww(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
=
xij − 3xjk
2
≥ 0 iﬀ xij ≥ 3xjk. (58)
so that under linear demand FTA tariﬀs under the regime h{ij, ik}i are
optimal from the viewpoint of global welfare maximization iﬀ xij = 3xjk.21
Proposition 5 is a striking result and deserves further discussion. The
first point to note is that the assumption that firms compete in quantities
plays a crucial role in delivering this result. As is well known, under quan-
tity competition firms with diﬀerent production costs can remain active in
production so long as demand is big enough. But from a world welfare per-
spective, this involves an ineﬃciency: holding constant the level of output,
20Under symmetry, it is clear that
dww(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τF
= −2xjk < 0
21If country k were to impose zero tariﬀs, a bilateral FTA between i and j can also give
higher welfare than free trade if country k is ineﬃcient.
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any reallocation of production towards the low cost producer (i.e. country k)
increases world welfare. Thus, the external tariﬀs of the two FTAs h{ij, ik}i
have two conflicting eﬀects on world welfare. On the one hand, such tariﬀs
tend to lower world welfare relative to free trade since they adversely eﬀect
the exports of countries j and k (both of which are higher cost than country
i). On other hand, FTA tariﬀs shift production in favor of country i and this
improves allocative eﬃciency. What proposition 5 argues is that it is quite
possible for the latter eﬀect to dominate the former. It is easy to show that
under linear demand if the (common) production cost of the two high cost
countries exceeds a certain threshold, then the pair of FTAs h{ij, ik}i yield
higher global welfare than free trade.
Given this result, it is natural to ask whether a CU can deliver higher
global welfare than free trade. The answer to this question turns out to be
a definite no. To see this, suppose countries i and j form a CU with each
other. Then we know that their optimal external tariﬀ solves
τu = argmax si(0, τ) + πji(0, τ) = argmax sj(0, τ) + πij(0, τ) (59)
which implies that
dsi(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τu
+
dπji(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τu
=
dsj(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τu
+
dπij(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τu
= 0 (60)
Given this, at the optimal external CU tariﬀ, the impact of a small change
in this tariﬀ on world welfare is given by
dww(0, τ)
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=τu
=
dπjk(τ, 0)
dτ
+
dπkj(τ, 0)
dτ
< 0 (61)
Thus, at the optimal CU tariﬀ, world welfare declines with a further increase
in the tariﬀ rate. In other words, the CU’s tariﬀ is too high and the formation
of a CU always lowers world welfare.
Proposition 6: Unlike an FTA, a customs union between two countries
always yields lower world welfare than global free trade.
Intuitively, since a CU already takes into account the export profits of
member countries in each other’s markets, any further increase in its tar-
iﬀ simply lowers export profits of the non-member thereby lowering world
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welfare. It is worth emphasizing that this result obtains because each FTA
member fails to account for export profits of the other member and under
cost asymmetry this can imply that the external tariﬀ of an FTA is too low
from a global welfare perspective. By contrast, a CU ignores the (negative)
impact of its tariﬀ on the non-member country and therefore always charges
an external tariﬀ that is too high from a global perspective, regardless of the
nature of underlying cost asymmetry across countries.
7 Concluding remarks
One of most important changes in the global trade policy landscape in the
last two decades or so has been the rapid emergence of PTAs. So endemic
are PTAs today that almost all countries participate in multiple PTAs. Even
though PTAs have received significant attention in the literature, two key as-
pects of PTAs have not been adequately analyzed. First, either much of the
literature has tended to take PTA tariﬀs as exogenously given or endogenized
tariﬀs under rather specific assumptions about preferences. Given that the
very purpose of PTAs is to alter the global structure of trade protection in
a discriminatory fashion, it is important to examine PTAs in an environ-
ment where tariﬀs are endogenously determined. Second, the fact that most
countries participate in multiple PTAs has been basically ignored in the an-
alytical literature. Given the realties of the multilateral trading system, it is
worth knowing whether membership in multiple PTAs diﬀers in any signifi-
cant manner from participation in a single PTA. This paper contributes to
the existing literature on PTAs along both these dimensions.
Our analysis yields several new results. First, it shows that the tariﬀ com-
plementarity eﬀect of PTAs is likely to hold even in the absence of linearity.
Second, it argues that when the (endogenously chosen) external tariﬀ of a
PTA is not too high, a PTA benefits both member and non-member coun-
tries. Third, it analyzes the welfare implications of a pair of independent
bilateral FTAs (that result in a ‘hub and spoke’ type trading arrangement)
and shows that such an arrangement increases the hub’s welfare even beyond
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what it can obtain under global free trade. Fourth, when countries are asym-
metric, such an arrangement can be welfare-preferred to global free trade if
the hub country is relatively low cost compared to the spoke countries since
the trade diversion inherent to such a regime enhances the eﬃciency of global
production. By contrast, such an outcome is never possible under a CU.
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